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CYBER-SILENCING THE COMMUNITY:
YOUTUBE, DIVINO GROUP, AND REIMAGINING SECTION 230

Layla G. Maurer*

ABSTRACT
Social media platforms, once simple messaging boards, have grown to colossal
size. They are now a vital source of communication and connection, particularly
for marginalized groups such as the LGBTQ+ community. Social media holds
incredible sway over the news, political discourse, and entertainment that we
consume, and the platforms we use are now able to sculpt conversations simply by
allowing or disallowing (i.e., moderating) specific types of speech or content.
One indirect form of moderation is demonetization, a means by which content
creators are disallowed revenue from advertisements on their hosted media. The
consequence of improper demonetization is not just financial: demonetized content
is also deprioritized and, in a sea of competing media, often overlooked or in some
cases entirely hidden. This process effectively removes demonetized voices from
the broader conversation, which is precisely what happened to a list of LGBTQ+
creators on YouTube starting in 2017. Those creators’ voices were—seemingly
unintentionally—silenced, as an algorithm inadvertently flagged their content as
“adult” or “sexually suggestive.” The creators lost following and revenue, and
YouTube as a host of online content faced no consequences for the error, thanks to
the protections afforded it by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of
1996. Section 230 has been treated as a shield for online platforms, as well as a
sword enabling those platforms to moderate content as they see fit (with several
restrictions).
Moderation is necessary and important in the broadest sense. However, modern
platforms, being a far cry from the messaging boards of the late 1990s in practically
every sense, must be held to higher account for the means by which they undertake
that moderation. This paper suggests a set of simple amendments to Section 230
that would allow for monetized content creators whose content had been
inappropriately flagged and demonetized to a) have that content remonetized and
b) to seek recourse in the form of fines levied against platforms that repeatedly misflag content that conforms with that platform’s stated policies. While this solution
is less than ideal, it is one which would place a higher onus on the platforms
themselves while still protecting those platforms’ rights to moderate as they see fit.

* Layla Maurer received her JD from Case Western Reserve University School of Law in May of
2022. She holds a Master’s in Library and Information Science from Kent State University and
has a career background in technology and digital media. She currently works for the legal
department at Wizards of the Coast, and is broadly interested in technology law, gaming law,
privacy, and digital citizenship. She has written on internet- and technology-based legal issues
including artificial intelligence, Section 230, and trademark for gamertags in Esports.
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INTRODUCTION
In August of 2019, eight LGBTQ+ creators 1 filed a class action lawsuit against
YouTube (via its parent company, Google) 2 in which they alleged that YouTube
specifically and unfairly targeted their content for flagging, restricted viewing, and
demonetization.3 The term “demonetization” on an ad-sponsored platform, such as
YouTube, means “the process wherein independent content creators are denied paid
advertisements in their video, thus denying them revenue and reducing their income
from the video-hosting platform.”4 A “creator” on YouTube is a power user or
YouTube “partner” who a) has established themselves, and their YouTube channel,
as a source of unique and follower-generating content and b) benefits from
YouTube’s monetization and internal recognition platforms, while not holding
employment as a paid influencer for a third party. 5
The creators’ lawsuit, Divino Group, LLC et al. v. Google LLC et al., considered
whether the censorship of LGBTQ+ content merited either a First Amendment
claim or a civil rights discrimination claim against the platform (or both).6 One
transgender creator, Chase Ross, provided evidence that his videos were restricted
when he included the word “trans” in their titles. 7 Another creator, Sal Bardo,
noticed in 2017 that his “benign” (non-sexually explicit or profane) LGBTQfocused videos had been placed in restricted mode and demonetized without notice
from YouTube.8 Bardo spoke to other creators in the community who claimed that
the same was happening to them: LGBTQ-focused videos (or those tagged with
LGBTQ+ keywords) were being targeted by YouTube’s blacklist algorithms.9

1

See Taylor Lorenz, The Real Difference Between Creators and Influencers, THE ATLANTIC (May
31, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/05/how-creators-becameinfluencers/590725/ for a discussion about the differences in terminology.
2
Class Action Complaint for Damages, Injunctive Relief, Restitution, and Declaratory Judgment,
Divino Group, LLC et al. v. Google LLC et al., No. 5:19CV04749 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2019).
3
James Hale, 8 Creators File Suit Against YouTube, Claiming it Discriminates Against LGBTQ+
Content, TUBEFILTER (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.tubefilter.com/2019/08/14/8-creators-file-suitagainst-youtube-claiming-it-discriminates-against-lgbtq-content/; see also Greg Bensinger & Reed
Albergotti, YouTube Discriminates Against LGBT Content by Unfairly Culling It, Suit Alleges,
WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/14/youtubediscriminates-against-lgbt-content-by-unfairly-culling-it-suit-alleges/.
4
Piper Thompson, Understanding YouTube Demonetization and the Adpocalypse, G2 LEARN HUB
(June 14, 2019), https://learn.g2.com/youtube-demonetization.
5
See Lorenz, supra note 1.
6
Class Action Complaint, supra note 2.
7
Chase Ross (@ChaseRoss), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017, 4:22 pm), https://twitter.com/ChaseRoss/
status/917122952176467969.
8
E.J. Dickson, Inside LGBTQ Vloggers’ Class-Action ‘Censorship’ Suit Against YouTube,
ROLLING STONE (Nov. 14, 2019, 1:54 pm), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturefeatures/lgbtq-youtube-lawsuit-censorship-877919/.
9
Id.; see also Lindsay Dodgson, YouTubers Have Identified a Long List of Words that
Immediately get Videos Demonetized, and They Include ‘Gay’ and ‘Lesbian’ but not ‘Straight’ or
‘Heterosexual’, INSIDER.COM (Oct. 1, 2019, 8:49 am), https://www.insider.com/youtubersidentify-title-words-that-get-videos-demonetized-experiment-2019-10.
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The company was apparently aware that the content had been flagged
inappropriately and was working to remedy the issue.10 However, even after
Bardo’s flags had been lifted in 2018, his content was re-flagged by late 2019.11 At
that time, Bardo received a message indicating his channel had been demonetized
because it contained “content isolated for the sole purpose of sexual gratification.”12
Despite the evidence provided by the plaintiffs, Magistrate Judge for the Northern
District of California Virginia K. DeMarchi indicated initial skepticism on the
merits of the case13 and, in January of 2021, granted Google et al.’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 14
YouTube itself has wavered on its own enforcement of policies regarding
censorship. In mid-2019, the platform overtly refused to take down videos from or
ban right-wing YouTuber Steven Crowder, who repeatedly targeted gay journalist
Carlos Maza using homophobic and racist slurs.15 Yet later that year (and likely in
response to the backlash on its refusal to moderate such content), it claimed that it
was instating and enforcing a new anti-harassment policy that would apply to
content that negatively targeted people based on race, gender expression, or sexual
orientation.16 Today, its policies indicate that it prefers not to censor content, as it
believes that “a broad range of perspectives ultimately makes us a stronger and
more informed society.”17 However, YouTube provides community guidelines
limiting spam, “sensitive” content (including sexual or adult content), violent
content, regulated goods, and misinformation generally.18 Its YouTube Partner
Program (“YPP”), which provides monetization for approved content creators,
dictates that creators must meet a specific list of requirements in order to retain
monetization rights.19 Those requirements,20 introduced in 2016—prior to the
current policies—specify that content creators must adhere to “advertiser-friendly
10

Dickson, supra note 8.
Id.
12
Id.
13
Dorothy Atkins, LGBTQ Bias Suit Against YouTube Faces Skeptical Judge, LAW360 (June 2,
2020, 6:59 pm), https://www.law360.com/articles/1279094/lgbtq-bias-suit-against-youtube-facesskeptical-judge.
14
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Divino Group LLC et al. v. Google LLC, et al., no. 19-cv04749-VKD (N.D. Cal. 2021).
15
Paolo Zialcita, YouTube Announces New Anti-Harassment Policy to Fight Racial, Gender,
LGBTQ Abuse, NPR (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/11/787165948/youtubeannounces-new-anti-harassment-policy-to-fight-racial-gender-lgbtq-abuse; see also Sara Ashley
O’Brian, YouTube CEO Apologizes to LGBTQ Community but Stands by Crowder Decision, CNN
BUSINESS (June 10, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/10/tech/youtube-susan-wojcicki-codecon/index.html.
16
Zialcita, supra note 15.
17
YOUTUBE.COM, POLICIES OVERVIEW,
https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/overview/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
18
YOUTUBE.COM, COMMUNITY GUIDELINES,
https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/community-guidelines/ (last visited Oct. 16,
2021).
19
GOOGLE SUPPORT, YOUTUBE CHANNEL MONETIZATION POLICIES,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1311392 (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
20
Tim Mulkerin, A Bunch of Famous YouTubers are Furious at YouTube Right Now – Here’s
Why, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/youtube-starsadvertiser-friendly-content-guidelines-2016-9.
11
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content guidelines.21 Specifically, they must not contain sexually suggestive
content, violence, “inappropriate language,” promotion of drugs, or “controversial
or sensitive subjects.”22
YouTube is the United States’ second-most visited website. 23 Its monthly hits
in August of 2021 numbered 4.62 billion. 24 As of May 2020, YouTube accounted
for 15 percent of all traffic on consumer broadband networks worldwide. 25 Despite
being a video platform, YouTube is also classified as “social media” 26 due to its
widespread and active community of users.27 Additionally, the platform’s
monetization is based upon numbers of views, shares, clicks, and interactions with
paid ads.28 It “monetizes” videos via “pre-roll, display, and other advertising
formats. Advertisers pay based on clicks and impressions,”29 which necessitates
social activity such as sharing and commenting. This weighs in favor of its being
considered a social tool. However, the classification of a platform as being “social”
does not automatically grant its users the right to free speech on that platform. In
fact, social media platforms are, as private platforms, entitled to censor as they see
fit. This is because they are not considered to be “public forums.”30
“Public forums,” elaborated upon in Part II below, are forums which provide a
protected space for public debate and assembly. 31 Judge DeMarchi argued in Divino
Group that, as private platforms, Google et al. would (a) not be subject to a civil
rights claim and (b) be entitled to “Section 230” protections.32 DeMarchi was
referring to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”).33
Section 230 was intended to protect publishers of third-party content from liability
for their users’ posts and activities on their platforms; this protection is granted to
any service that publishes third-party content, and has today been expanded to

21

GOOGLE SUPPORT, ADVERTISER-FRIENDLY CONTENT GUIDELINES,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6162278 (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
22
Mulkerin, supra note 20.
23
Top 100: The Most Visited Websites in the US [2021 Top Websites Edition], SEMRUSH.COM,
https://www.semrush.com/blog/most-visited-websites/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2021) [hereinafter Top
100].
24
Id.
25
Peter Suciu, YouTube Remains the Most Dominant Social Media Platform, FORBES (Apr. 7,
2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2021/04/07/youtube-remains-the-most-dominantsocial-media-platform/.
26
See Top 100, supra note 23 (depicting a chart of insights on the most popular sites in the US by
industry, wherein YouTube is categorized as a “social network”).
27
See Stephen Tornetta, The Case for YouTube as a Social Media Channel, CHATTERBLAST (Sept.
20, 2019), https://chatterblast.com/the-case-for-youtube-as-a-social-media-channel/.
28
Mary Hall, How Do People Make Money on YouTube?, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 6, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/012015/how-do-people-make-money-videos-theyupload-youtube.asp.
29
Id.
30
Public Forum, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/public%20forum
(last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
31
Id.
32
Divino Group LLC et al. v. Google LLC et al., 2021 WL 51715 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
33
47 U.S.C. § 230 [hereinafter Section 230].
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include social media platforms where “third parties” are the users of those
platforms.34
This paper argues that Section 230, despite its role in fostering the exchange of
information on the internet, has been misapplied due to its drafters’ understandable
lack of foresight into what the internet has become both as a source of
communication and of income for content creators. Part I discusses the origins of
the Divino Group lawsuit and the importance of YouTube content creation as a
source of income for the LGBTQ+ community. Part II elaborates upon Section 230
and its legislative history. Part III suggests language for modifying Section 230 to
provide recourse for monetized content creators whose content has been
inappropriately flagged and demonetized—in other words, censored—irrespective
of whether the censorship was intentional.
PART I: THE PATH TO DIVINO GROUP AND THE ROADBLOCKS FOLLOWING
The Divino Group case was motivated by the repeated flagging, removal, and
demonetization of content created by LGBTQ+ identifying creators. In 2017,
creators such as Chase Ross,35 Rowan Ellis,36 Tyler Oakley,37 Stevie Boebi,38 and
NeonFiona39 began vocally complaining that their content had been “hidden,
demonetized, or age-gated.”40 Chase Ross and NeonFiona both provided screenshot
evidence on their respective Twitter accounts showing that their channels’ content
had been restricted due to the inclusion of certain keywords in their videos’ titles.
Ross’ videos including the word “trans*” were flagged and demonetized. 41 In
NeonFiona’s case, viewing her channel in “restricted mode,”42 which limits
accessible videos to non-adult content, caused videos including the words “gay,”

34

CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
35
See Ross, supra note 7.
36
Rowan Ellis is a “video essayist and creator” who creates content based on LGBTQ+ issues and
pop culture. Rowan Ellis, About, ROWANELLIS.COM, https://www.rowanellis.com/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2021).
37
Tyler Oakley is a gay advocate for LGBTQ+ youth who created YouTube content every week
from October 2007 to December 2020. See Tyler Oakley, About: Tyler Oakley,
TYLEROAKLEY.COM, https://tyleroakley.com/ (last accessed Oct. 31, 2021).
38
Stevie Boebi is a lesbian creator who acts as an “advocate for the lesbian community, and the
LGBTQ+ world at large.” SHORTY AWARDS, STEVIE BOEBI, https://shortyawards.com/
9th/stevieboebi (last accessed Oct. 31, 2021); see also Stevie Boebi (@stevieboebi), TUMBLR,
https://stevieboebi.tumblr.com/ (last accessed Oct. 31, 2021).
39
“NeonFiona” is a bisexual YouTube creator. See NeonFiona (@neonfiona), YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/c/neonfiona/videos (last accessed Oct. 31, 2021).
40
Megan Farokhmanesh, YouTube is Still Restricting and Demonetizing LGBT Videos – and
Adding Anti-LGBT Ads to Some, THE VERGE (June 4, 2018, 2:46 pm),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/4/17424472/youtube-lgbt-demonetization-ads-algorithm.
41
Ross, supra note 7.
42
See Niraj Chokshi, YouTube Filtering Draws Ire of Gay and Transgender Creators, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/technology/youtube-lgbt-videos.html.
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“girlfriend,” “lesbian,” and “bisexual” to disappear from the list of available
content.43
Authors Wayne Wilkinson and Stephen Berry consider these restrictions a
consequence of the “YouTube Adpocalypse of 2017.”44 The “Adpocalypse”45
began with a series of controversial videos posted on the channels of several
popular YouTube creators in 2016-17: Felix Kjellberg (“PewDiePie”), whose video
included anti-Semitic and alt-right propaganda;46 Logan Paul, who traveled to
Aokigahara Forest and posted a video depicting the body of someone who died
from suicide;47 and Steven Crowder, a prominent right-wing conservative who
slandered gay journalist Carlos Maza.48 Advertisers began boycotting the platform
in response to their ads being placed on videos such as PewDiePie’s, Paul’s, and
Crowder’s.49 YouTube took immediate steps to implement advertiser protections
in response to the PewDiePie video,50 resulting in the “Advertiser-Friendly Content
Guidelines” of 2016.51 Soon after, content creators began seeing “dips in revenue”
as these policies allowed advertisers to selectively “pull their ads from videos they
disagreed with or found [to be] distasteful.” 52 Months later following the removal
of the Logan Paul video,53 YouTube further honed its new policies to create specific
requirements for ad revenue.54 In order to monetize, creators needed a) at least
“4,000 hours of accrued watch time” in the last 12 months and b) over 1,000

43

NeonFiona (@neonfiona), TWITTER (Mar. 16, 2017), https://twitter.com/neonfiona/status/
842390135257874432.
44
Wayne W. Wilkinson & Stephen D. Berry, Together They Are Troy and Chase: Who Supports
Demonetization of Gay Content on YouTube?, 9(2) PSYCH. POPULAR MEDIA 224, 224 (2020).
45
See, e.g., Sangeet Kumar, The Algorithmic Dance: YouTube’s Adpocalypse and the Gatekeeping
of Cultural Content on Digital Platforms, 8(2) INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1 (2019); Rachel Dunphy,
Can YouTube Survive the Adpocalypse?, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/12/can-youtube-survive-the-adpocalypse.html; Piper
Thomson, Understanding YouTube Demonetization and the Adpocalypse, G2.COM (June 14,
2019), https://learn.g2.com/youtube-demonetization.
46
Thomson, supra note 4; see also Aja Romano, The Controversy Over YouTube Star PewDiePie
and His Anti-Semitic “Jokes,” Explained, VOX (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.vox.com/culture/
2017/2/17/14613234/pewdiepie-nazi-satire-alt-right.
47
See Robinson Meyer, The Social-Media Star and the Suicide, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/a-social-media-stars-error/549479/; see
also Thomson, supra note 4.
48
O’Brian, supra note 15.
49
See, e.g., Steven Sanford, YouTube and the Adpocalypse: How Have the New YouTube
Advertising Friendly Guidelines Shaped Creator Participation and Audience Engagement? (2018)
(M.Sc. Thesis, Lund University) (on file with university) (“Across an 18 month period covering
starting in 2016, YouTube was subjected to a major advertising boycott … During this period a
large number of high profile brands began to quickly and quietly withdraw their adverts, en masse.
This was done after it was discovered that a number of them had been placed, via the platforms
automatic algorithm, in thousands of videos which broadcast messages of hate, violence and
extremism”).
50
Thomson, supra note 4.
51
See Mulkerin, supra note 20; see also ADVERTISER-FRIENDLY CONTENT GUIDELINES, supra
note 21.
52
Thomson, supra note 4.
53
Meyer, supra note 47.
54
Thomson, supra note 4.
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subscribers.55 One effect of these statistical requirements was that “[h]uge numbers
of channels were purged from ad networks”56 while the creators strove to meet the
new standards—or waited to find out whether they would have sufficient numbers
at the end of 12 months.57
While the second tweak to monetization may not have had a striking effect on
LGBTQ+ creators, the third and final change certainly did. This change followed
the widespread backlash from YouTube’s decision not to censor or remove Steven
Crowder’s overtly homophobic videos attacking a gay Vox journalist.58 YouTube
initially stood by its decision in the Crowder controversy, though it later “flipflopped” and suspended Crowder’s monetization. 59 YouTube then chose to reassess
how advertisers were being affected by controversial content.60 In a seeming effort
to shift responsibility for ad placements from YouTube to the ad companies
themselves, this change allowed for advertisers to specifically exclude broad
categories of content. Those categories are: 1) “tragedy and conflict”; 2) “sensitive
social issues”; 3) “sexually suggestive content”; 4) “sensational and shocking”; and
“profanity and rough language.”61 These categories were not visible to content
creators, only to advertisers.62 Thus, creators had no way to know whether their
content fell under the aforementioned categories. As of today, advertisers can also
choose a Standard Content option for their ad placement which broadly restricts
“sexual” content.63
Even more importantly, YouTube took the step of updating its content-flagging
algorithm to be “more stringent”—with the side effect of “the algorithm
automatically demonetizing and de-platforming numerous channels that simply
covered sensitive and controversial issues.”64 LGBTQ+ creators noticed that their
videos, and revenue, were being affected by these changes soon after they were
implemented. The Divino Group complaint alleged that the changes to the
algorithm, as well as the categorizations offered to advertising companies, were
automatically, discriminatorily, and unfairly causing ads to be removed from the
named creators’ videos.65 The complaint also accused YouTube of discrimination
on the basis that YouTube admitted to “hiding from view” content that included or
referenced “same-sex relationships” and “pop culture from a feminist and queer
perspective.”66
55

Id.
Id.
57
Id.
58
See Danny Nett, Is YouTube Doing Enough to Stop Harassment of LGBTQ Content Creators?,
NPR (June 8, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/08/730608664/is-youtube-doing-enough-tostop-harassment-of-lgbtq-content-creators.
59
Jennifer Elias, YouTube Flip-Flops on Suspending Video Blogger Accused of Harassment,
CNBC (June 5, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/05/youtube-flip-flops-on-steven-crowdersuspension.html.
60
Id.
61
Kumar, supra note 45, at 4.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Thomson, supra note 4.
65
Class Action Complaint, supra note 2.
66
Id. at para. 11.
56
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YouTube is, in essence, a source of media and entertainment, and some might
believe that simply removing advertisements or flagging content as “adult” does
very little harm to those posting the content. However, YouTube is not strictly a
“media repository” but rather provides “a substantial (or exclusive) source of
income for many content creators through advertising revenue.” 67 Demonetization
is thus “censorship by proxy.”68
Furthermore, many creators fund their channels and build their brands through
advertising revenue alone.69 Since YouTube has a massive presence on the internet,
accounting for the majority of video consumption in the United States and boasting
2.6 billion users worldwide,70 it is the preeminent option for creators who want to
build a global brand presence via video. However, YouTube is not required to allow
all content creators to host their videos on its platform or pay all users for their
views. As a private company it can selectively choose the type and availability of
its users’ content, despite that content’s role in providing income to the creator.
Censorship, in this context, is permissible; but if the company’s stance is to support
and permit specific communities’ content—as it claims with the LGBTQ+
community71—then mistaken censorship that punishes those communities ought to
result in recourse and compensation for those affected. The issue as highlighted by
the court in its reasoning for dismissing the Divino Group suit,72 is that social media
platforms like YouTube do not guarantee free speech.
PART II: SPEECH ON THE INTERNET AND SECTION 230
There exists, understandably, widespread confusion about what exactly is
protected or protectable speech when it comes to online platforms. Articles and
debates on the nature of free speech on the internet—and whether the internet
should be regulated—have existed since the birth of the internet as a medium for
communications.73 As early as 1996, “cyberspace activist” John Perry Barlow
poetically declared:
67

Wilkinson & Berry, supra note 44, at 224.
Id.
69
Id. at 225.
70
See Suciu, supra note 25; see also YouTube User Statistics 2022, GLOBALMEDIAINSIGHT (Apr.
18, 2022), https://www.globalmediainsight.com/blog/youtube-users-statistics/ (indicating that
YouTube has 2.6 billion unique users generating “billions of views” on the platform, and that
YouTube is the “second-most trafficked website after Google”).
71
See Abby Ohlheiser, LGBT Creators Wonder Whether YouTube Really Supports Them or Just
Pretends To During Pride Month, WASH. POST (June 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/06/06/lgbt-creators-wonder-whether-youtube-really-supports-them-or-justpretends-during-pride-month/.
72
See generally Divino Group LLC et al. v. Google LLC et al., 2021 WL 51715 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
73
See, e.g., James J. Black, Free Speech & The Internet: The Inevitable Move Toward
Government Regulation, 4 RICHMOND J. L. & TECH. 1 (1997) (suggesting that activity on the
“Net” would fall under regulations according to where the speech/activity originated and
discussing differences in free speech regulations according to geographic location); see also Helen
Roberts, Research Paper 35 (1995-96): Can the Internet be Regulated?, AUSTL. PARLIAMENT
HOUSE, https://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary
_library/pubs/rp/rp9596/96rp35 (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
68
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Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On
behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one,
so I address you with no greater authority than that with which
liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are
building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to
impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess
any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.
74

Although Barlow—someone with “no technical expertise” but who held “a
reputation as a prophet of new technology”75—and his sympathizers may have had
sweeping ideals surrounding what they hoped was a cyberlibertarian future, those
ideals have not truly come to pass. They have, however, been ingrained in the
debate over whether speech on the internet is “free” and whether the internet is, or
ought to be, considered separate from the “real world” 76 and thus regulated or
deregulated in a unique manner.
A. The Necessity of, and Unintended Consequences from, Private
Moderation
1. “Free Speech” as a Moving Target
Internet speech regulation and moderation entered the purview of the Supreme
Court early on, and the Court has a history of selectively eschewing regulation of
internet-based speech. In 1997 in Reno v. ACLU, the Court ruled that restrictions
on the “display” and “transmission” of what was deemed “indecent”
communications online violated the First Amendment, lending credence to the idea
that internet speech is truly free. 77 However, five years later in 2002—as the
internet, and access to it, was broadening exponentially—the Court grappled with
definitions of protected expression and obscenity. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech
74

John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND.: JOHN PERRY BARLOW LIBR., https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence
(last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
75
Michael Buozis, Making Common Sense of Cyberlibertarian Ideology: The Journalistic
Consecration of John Perry Barlow, TAYLOR & FRANCIS ONLINE (July 7, 2021),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/24701475.2021.1943994.
76
See Katharine Gelber & Susan J. Brison, Digital Dualism and the “Speech as Thought”
Paradox, in FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 12, 17 (Susan J. Brison & Katharine Gelber eds.,
2019) (arguing that “[t]hose who claim a special sphere of speech online misconstrue the nature of
speech itself and use unviable arguments for its protection” and that cyberspace should not be
distinguished from the “real world”).
77
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also Robert Corn-Revere, Internet & First
Amendment Overview, FREEDOM FORUM INST. (Nov. 20, 2002), https://www.freedomforum
institute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/internet-first-amendment/.

182

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol. 17:2

Coalition, the Court found that “virtual” child pornography not involving actual
children was “protected expression” under the First Amendment.78 Later that year
in Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Court upheld the Child Online Protection Act (COPA)79
as a means of regulating expression, but remanded to the lower court for a
determination as to what constituted “obscenity law” in the modern age. 80 Since
that time the landscape, and very nature, of the internet has evolved in such a
manner that regulation has become increasingly necessary. The First Amendment
question has shifted from a conversation around obscenity and protection of
children to one of threatening (or, “true threat”)81 language and spread of
misinformation.82 As authors on Bloomberg put it in June of 2021, “the debate is
over how, not whether, to filter what’s said online.” 83
2. Shifting Sands and the Social Media Debate
In the twenty years since Ashcroft v. ACLU, the makeup and content of the
internet has become virtually unrecognizable compared to that shared on earlier
platforms. When Ashcroft was decided, accessing information online was a
markedly slower task84 and the percentage of people using the internet was far
smaller. According to Pew Research Center, 82% of American adults were on the
internet in 2015.85 That percentage, in 2000, was 50%,86 but with a significant
portion of those users being between the ages of 18-29.87 The draw for younger
adults was not to locate information or even share news; the internet in the early
2000s was primarily a source of entertainment and of limited connectivity with a
78

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); see also Corn-Revere, supra note 77.
Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998); see also ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp.
2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (Enjoining enforcement of COPA on Fourth and Fifth Amendment
grounds); Mukasey v. ACLU, 555 U.S. 1137 (2009) (refusing certiorari and in so doing affirming
the Gonzales decision).
80
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); see also Corn-Revere, supra note 77.
81
A “true threat” in First Amendment jurisprudence is “a statement that is meant to frighten or
intimidate one or more specified persons into believing that they will be seriously harmed by the
speaker or someone acting at the speaker’s behest” and involve a “serious expression of an intent
to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Kevin
Francis O’Neill & David L. Hudson, Jr., True Threats, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1025/true-threats (June 2017) (citing Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)).
82
See Megan R. Murphy, Comment, Context, Content, Intent: Social Media’s Role in True Threat
Prosecutions, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 733 (2020).
83
Sarah Frier, Naomi Nix, & Sarah Kopit, Why Free Speech on the Internet Isn’t Free for All,
BLOOMBERG TECH: QUICK TAKE (June 19, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2021-06-19/why-free-speech-on-the-internet-isn-t-free-for-all-quicktake.
84
In 2007, average internet access speed was 3.67 Mbps; in 2017 it was 18.75 Mbps. S. O’Dea,
Average Internet Connection Speed in the United States from 2007-2017 (in Mbps), by Quarter,
STATISTA (July 22, 2020).
85
Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015/ (June 26,
2015).
86
Id.
87
Id.
79

2022]

CYBER-SILENCING THE COMMUNITY

183

pre-existing group of friends.88 A staggering 92% of that same age bracket were
active users in 2015.89 Among senior citizens, a demographic most often targeted
by misinformation and “fake news” efforts, 90 the percentage of internet users spiked
from 14% in 2000 to 58% in 2015,91 with the majority becoming active online after
2012.92
Why is this important? Simply put, the internet is being used less as a place of
sporadic connectivity and more as an intrinsic part of people’s everyday lives.
Society relies on the internet for news, communication, creative content, audio and
video streaming, and much, much more—including use of, and access to, the
phenomenon of “social media.”93 Social media is a development that evolved from
a mere profile-uploading service in 1997 to the platforms we think of today:94
Facebook, Reddit, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, Snapchat, and TikTok, primarily.95
Although they are privately-owned entities, the fact that they frequently host
content which is available for widespread public consumption has led to broad
confusion about the platforms’ rights to censor that content.96 YouTube is a
privately-owned content provider that hosts user-created content and encourages
content sharing. It is by definition “social media,” and subject to the same confusion
that plagues other hosts of user speech.
3. YouTube, Despite Its Publicly Shareable Content, is Not a Public Site
Most of the world would consider YouTube to be a “public” site; however, it,
as a social media platform (and the most popular one as of 2021),97 is anything but.
Because social media platforms are not considered public forums,98 they are largely
free to censor user content, with the exception that government accounts on those

88

For a description of early- to mid-2000s websites and their purposes, see Clinton Nguyen, These
Websites Defined the Early 2000s – Here’s Where They Are Now, BUSINESSINSIDER (Oct. 5,
2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-happened-to-early-2000s-websites-2016-10.
89
Perrin & Duggan, supra note 85.
90
See, e.g., Nadia M. Brashier & Daniel L. Schacter, Aging in an Era of Fake News, 29(3) CURR.
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 316 (2020).
91
Perrin & Duggan, supra note 85.
92
Id.
93
Social media is “web-based communication tools that enable people to interact with each other
by sharing and consuming information.” Daniel Nations, What is Social Media?, LIFEWIRE (Jan.
26, 2021), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-social-media-explaining-the-big-trend-3486616.
94
The Evolution of Social Media: How Did it Begin, and Where Could it Go Next?, ARTICLES:
MARYVILLE UNIV., https://online.maryville.edu/blog/evolution-social-media/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2022) (referencing the site “Six Degrees”).
95
Id. (listing major social media platforms as of 2022).
96
See, e.g., Natalie Strossen, Transcript, Does the First Amendment Apply to Social Media
Companies?, TALKSONLAW, https://www.talksonlaw.com/briefs/does-the-first-amendmentrequire-social-media-platforms-to-grant-access-to-all-users (last visited Feb. 25, 2022).
97
See Salvador Rodriguez, YouTube is Social Media’s Big Winner During the Pandemic, CNBC
(Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/07/youtube-is-social-medias-big-winner-duringthe-pandemic.html.
98
Public Forum, supra note 30.
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platforms may not silence users who are responding to the government’s speech.99
Despite this, the internet and “social media in particular” 100 have become critical
for the expression of protected speech.101 Jack Dorsey, the creator of Twitter, stated
in 2018 that he believes Twitter should be a “public square” where “activists,
marginalized communities, whistleblowers, journalists, governments and the most
influential people in the world” have an “open and free exchange” of ideas.102
Recently, in April of 2022, billionaire Elon Musk of Tesla and SpaceX offered to
purchase Twitter for $44 billion, stating that “free speech is the bedrock of a
functioning democracy, and Twitter is the digital town square where matters vital
to the future of humanity are debated.”103 Musk’s offer was accepted, 104 but critics
have already levied harsh opinions against Musk and his Barlow-esque dream of a
cyberlibertarian platform. 105 Those critics point out that a lack of moderation leads
not only to a free-for-all arena for hate speech and bigotry, 106 but also potential
legal implications if Musk intends not to moderate Twitter’s European users.107
Regardless of Dorsey and Musk’s idealistic visions, only the government—not
private platforms—can affirmatively create new public spaces.108 The government
has not done so in the context of social media generally; the exception lies in
(correctly) labeling the official account pages of government officials as being truly
public.109
This affirmative lack of government action in social media was the crux of the
reason that Judge DeMarchi opted to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint in Divino
Group. The plaintiffs’ first claim, for violation of their First Amendment rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,110 failed because to state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs
“must plead facts showing that a person acting under color of state law proximately

99

See CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10141, UPDATE: SIDEWALKS, STREETS, AND TWEETS: IS TWITTER
A PUBLIC FORUM? (2019).
100

Id.
Id.
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Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2018, 1:56 pm), https://twitter.com/jack/status/
1037399119810232321.
103
Bobby Allyn, Elon Musk Bought Twitter. Here’s What He Says He’ll Do Next, NPR (Apr. 25,
2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/04/25/1094671225/elon-musk-bought-twitter-plans.
104
Id.
105
See, e.g., Marc Ginsberg, Elon Musk’s Twitter ‘Free Speech’ Mirage, THE HILL (Apr. 29,
2022), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/3471557-elon-musks-twitter-free-speech-mirage/;
Mutale Nkonde, Elon Musk Says He Wants Free Speech on Twitter. But for Whom?, SLATE:
FUTURETENSE (Apr. 27, 2022), https://slate.com/technology/2022/04/elon-musk-free-speechtwitter-for-whom.html; Natasha Lomas, Will Elon Musk Put Twitter on a Collision Course with
Global Speech Regulators?: ‘Free Speech Absolutism’ Versus Digital Regulation in Europe and
Beyond…, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 26, 2022), https://techcrunch.com/2022/04/26/elon-musk-freespeech-regulation/.
106
Ginsberg, supra note 105.
107
Lomas, supra note 105.
108
CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 99.
109
See, e.g., E.A. Gjelten, Can Government Officials Block Critics on Social Media?,
LAWYERS.COM (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/can-governmentofficials-block-critics-social-media.html.
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Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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caused a violation of their constitutional or other federal rights.” 111 Here, the
plaintiffs acknowledged that Google et al. were private entities, but attempted to
argue that the defendants “should be considered state actors” because the
defendants “designated” YouTube as a public forum for free expression. 112
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, no person was acting under color of state law, nor
did any government authority designate the platform a “public forum.”
The “public forum” label is one that platforms and courts tend to eschew due to
the substantial inferences associated with it. In 2018, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook
(now “Meta”)113 avoided answering Senator Ted Cruz’s repeated questions relating
to whether Facebook was a “neutral public forum.” 114 Similarly, in Prager
University v. Google LLC (“Prager III”), the Ninth Circuit overtly and directly
stated that YouTube is not a public forum. 115 This seems counterintuitive
considering the growing importance of the internet as a means of communication,
notably among “digital natives” (“[c]hildren and young people born into and raised
in a digital world (post-1980)”),116 but the reality is that platforms can censor as
they wish.117
The internet’s role in public debate was particularly visible during both the 2020
United States election cycle and the COVID-19 pandemic.118 Fake news media
sources and “echo chambers”119 proved extremely problematic,120 leading to
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Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Divino Group et al. v. Google LLC et al., no. 19-cv-04749VKD, at *4.
112
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113
See Mark Zuckerberg, Founder’s Letter, 2021, META (Oct. 28, 2021),
https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/founders-letter/, for information on the change to “Meta;” see
also Press Release, Facebook.com, Introducing Meta: A Social Technology Company (Oct. 28,
2021) (discussing Facebook’s change in branding and vision for the future).
114
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Republicans Disagree, WJLA: ABC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://wjla.com/news/nationworld/zuckerberg-insists-facebook-is-platform-for-all-ideas-but-republicans-disagree.
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trends/digitalnatives (last visited Apr. 29, 2022).
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See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 99.
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See, e.g., Alessandro Gabbiadini et al., Together Apart: The Mitigating Role of Digital
Communication Technologies on Negative Affect During the COVID-19 Outbreak in Italy, 11
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1 (ECOLLECTION 2020) (2020); see also Adrian Wong et al., The Use of
Social Media and Online Communications in Times of Pandemic COVID-19, 22(3) J. INTENSIVE
CARE SOC’Y 255 (2020); Davey Alba & Sheera Frenkel, From Voter Fraud to Vaccine Lies:
Misinformation Peddlers Shift Gears, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/16/technology/from-voter-fraud-to-vaccine-lies-misinformation-peddlers-shift-gears.html
(last updated Jan. 7, 2021) (discussing the spread of “false vaccine narratives” by right-wing
figures in an attempt to “maintain attention and influence” after the 2020 election cycle).
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See Matteo Cinelli et al., The Echo Chamber Effect on Social Media, 118(9) PROCEEDINGS
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1 (2021).
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See, e.g., Ingrid Hsieh-Yee, Can We Trust Social Media?, 25(1-2) INTERNET REF. SERVS. Q. 9
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politically-based arguments over whether platforms were unfairly favoring a
particular viewpoint in the wake of profound tides of misinformation.121
But rather than treat platforms as truly public, many (successfully) called for
the platforms to create and enact policies purporting to fight that misinformation.122
Even Reddit—whose self-proclaimed policy is to allow “open and authentic”
debate—now selectively bans and moderates content on its platform. 123 Similarly,
many platforms only selectively censor content, 124 with the larger platforms opting
to do so by algorithm.125
Without critical eyes on the datasets that such algorithms use for moderation,
“benign” content—such as Sal Bardo’s—is at risk for inappropriate or unintended
moderation.126 While a deeper discussion of the unintended and evidently biased
results of algorithmic moderation is beyond the scope of this paper, it is notable
that algorithmic bias is a topic of debate for both regulatory authorities and
technology content providers.127 Whether manual or algorithmic, any undue or
See, e.g., Jessica Guynn, ‘You’re the Ultimate Editor,’ Twitter’s Jack Dorsey and Facebook’s
Mark Zuckerberg Accused of Censoring Conservatives, USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/11/17/facebook-twitter-dorsey-zuckerberg-donaldtrump-conservative-bias-antitrust/6317585002/; Vera Bergengruen, Under Scrutiny, Facebook
and Twitter Face Their Biggest Test on Election Day, TIME (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://time.com/5906854/facebook-twitter-election-day/; Taberez Ahmed Neyazi et al.,
Misinformation Concerns and Online News Participation Among Internet Users in India, 7 SOC.
MEDIA & SOC’Y 1 (2021); Sarah Kreps, The Role of Technology in Online Misinformation,
BROOKINGS: FOREIGN POL’Y (June 2020); Denise-Marie Ordway, Fake News and the Spread of
Misinformation: A Research Roundup, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://journalistsresource.org/politics-and-government/fake-news-conspiracy-theories-journalismresearch/.
122
See, e.g., COMMUNITY GUIDELINES, supra note 18; COVID-19 Misleading Information Policy,
TWITTER.COM, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/medical-misinformation-policy (last
visited Oct. 16, 2021); Nick Clegg, Combating COVID-19 Misinformation Across Our Apps,
FACEBOOK.COM (Mar. 25, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/combating-covid-19misinformation/.
123
See Steve Huffman (@spez), REDDIT (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.reddit.com/r/
announcements/comments/pbmy5y/debate_dissent_and_protest_on_reddit/ (stating that “Dissent
is a part of Reddit and the foundation of democracy. Reddit is a place for open and authentic
discussion and debate. This includes conversations that question or disagree with popular
consensus. This includes conversations that criticize those that disagree with the majority opinion.
This includes protests that criticize or object to our decisions on which communities to ban from
the platform”).
124
See Ashwini Ashokkumar et al., Censoring Political Opposition Online: Who Does It and Why,
91 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 104031 (2020); for a discussion on selective content moderation, see
also Sanaz Talaifar et al., Political Censorship in the Digital Age, SOC’Y PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH.: CHARACTER & CONTEXT (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.spsp.org/news-center/blog/talaifarashokkumar-swann-political-censorship.
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VERGE (Nov. 13, 2020, 9:00 am), https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/13/21562596/facebook-aimoderation; Francesca Duchi, Problematic Algorithms: YouTube’s Censorship and
Demonetization Problem, MEDIUM.COM (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/13/
21562596/facebook-ai-moderation.
126
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Resistance, 34 PHILOSOPHY & TECH. 739-66 (2021).
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discriminatory moderation currently goes without consequence, as evidenced by
Divino Group. The social media platforms performing the moderation are heavily
relying on the protections afforded to them by Section 230 of the CDA.
B. Section 230’s Applicability in Divino Group
One part of the Divino Group dismissal was based on Judge DeMarchi’s
assessment of the plaintiffs’ claim that, by leaning on Section 230 of the CDA, the
defendants’ “private conduct bec[ame] state action ‘endorsed’ by the federal
government.”128 Judge DeMarchi relied on Prager III in determining that
YouTube’s “hosting of speech on a private platform is not a traditional and
exclusive government function” and that the Supreme Court has “consistently
declined to find that private entities engage in state action, except in limited
circumstances.”129 Judge DeMarchi stated that the standard is to “start with the
presumption that conduct by private actors is not state action. [Plaintiff] bears the
burden of establishing that Defendants were state actors.”130
However, Judge DeMarchi did not directly address the protections granted by
Section 230, other than to say that Section 230 was designed “to keep government
interference in [internet communication] to a minimum.”131 In so doing, Judge
DeMarchi followed a long trend of selective application and misapplication of
Section 230 protections.132 Such misapplication is understandable given the law’s
tenuous relationship with technology, but no longer acceptable considering the
current socially-focused state of the internet—and the fact that the CDA was
enacted in 1996, twenty-five years earlier than the Divino Group (and other related)
decisions.

128

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Divino Group et al. v. Google LLC et al., no. 19-cv-04749VKD, at *4.
129
Id. at *4 (citing Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 997-99 (9th Cir. 2020)).
130
Id. at *15 (citing Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir.
2011)).
131
Id. at *17 (citing Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003)).
132
For a discussion of the history of Section 230 application/misapplication, see, e.g., Neil Fried,
Why Section 230 Isn’t Really a Good Samaritan Provision, DIGITALFRONTIERS ADVOCACY:
BLOGS & OPEDS (Mar. 24, 2021), https://digitalfrontiersadvocacy.com/blogs-and-op-eds/f/whysection-230-isnt-really-a-good-samaritan-provision (“Courts have concluded [the language of §
230(c)(1)] ‘creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.’ Consequently, judges
have ruled that platforms cannot be held culpable for negligently, recklessly, or knowingly
facilitating terrorism, harassment, sexual disparagement, non-consensual dissemination of intimate
photos, housing discrimination, distribution of child sexual abuse materials, and other unlawful
conduct by their users. Absent that potential liability, platforms are less likely to moderate content,
not more.”); see also Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1608 (2018) (“courts have grappled with [the
paradox in applications of § 230] and occasionally broken with the expansive interpretation of the
Good Samaritan provision to find a lack of § 230 immunity”).
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C. The Intent of Section 230 and What Needs to Change
Section 230 has an astonishing amount of deference afforded to it by courts and
tech moguls alike, often due to their misunderstanding of the intent behind the
legislation.133 Just recently, the Supreme Court denied a request to “clarify the
meaning” of the law, a request made because so often the people bringing
complaints against it fail to ascertain the purpose of the writing. 134 Justice Thomas
has opined that lower courts wrongly read more expansive protections than the Act
was intended for,135 while Presidents Trump and Biden have both espoused distrust
of the law and argued for its removal or revision (each in different ways).136
Just what was the intent behind Section 230? Section 230 is part of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), a piece of legislation that stemmed from
the general idea that Congress should protect internet users—particularly
children—from accessing unwanted materials such as pornography on the newlyburgeoning World Wide Web. 137 The CDA was Senator James Exon’s “battle”
against pornographers, those he would refer to as “barbarians” at the digital gate,
luring children in, causing the internet to become a “red light district.” 138 The House
thoroughly and hotly debated the CDA’s constitutionality; Exon’s language was so
far overreaching that even Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich opposed it.139
Gingrich stated that Exon’s proposed limitations on access were “clearly a violation
of free speech and … the right of adults to communicate with each other.” 140
Amidst the debate over the CDA, a 1995 case, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Servs. Co. [hereinafter Prodigy] was brought to the courts.141 In Prodigy,
a New York state court found an internet platform, Prodigy, liable for defamation
because a Prodigy user had claimed that a bank had committed securities fraud; that
133
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134
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Push Social Media Giants to Crack Down on Misinformation, CNN (July 20, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/20/politics/white-house-section-230-facebook/index.html, for
information on President Biden’s initial attempts to change the law
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141
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Super. Ct. May 24,
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is to say, the court decided that Prodigy had the same “publisher” liabilities as a
traditional newspaper or other published source in acting as the “speaker”
responsible for third-party content.142 This holding differed from that of an earlier
New York case, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., in which CompuServe was found
not to be a “publisher” of online content. 143 The Prodigy court distinguished its case
by stating that Prodigy, unlike CompuServe, had adopted content standards that
likened it enough to a traditional publisher that similar liabilities should apply. 144
In May of 1995, during the debate surrounding the CDA, Prodigy was decided.
Immediately following that decision, two Congressmen who had some insight into
technologies, Representatives Chris Cox and Ron Wyden, managed to realize what
effect labeling online platforms as “publishers” would have on the growth of the
internet and tied that into an amendment to the CDA.145 The Cox-Wyden
amendment, titled the “Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act,” 146 was
introduced in June of 1995 as House Bill 1555 (104th Cong.).147 Cox stated that
their bill would “protect computer Good Samaritans, online service providers,
anyone who provides a front end to the Internet … who takes steps to screen
indecency;”148 their bill would protect those entities from liability.149 Cox and
Wyden thus introduced the language that would become Section 230. It was this
language that convinced the House to pass a version of the CDA.150
The language of Section 230(c)(1) reads: “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”151 This language has been
deemed “the twenty-six words that created the Internet.” 152 It enabled the free
exchange of information online while protecting the hosts of that information from
liability for speech that they simply could not logistically or feasibly control; in
short, “Section 230 allowed companies such as Prodigy to determine what
moderation practices and policies best serve their users, without being exposed to
massive potential liability.”153 Additionally, Section 230(c)(2) provides immunity
for platforms that remove or restrict content that they consider “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
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whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”154 This is the language
that platforms rely on in moderating, censoring, and demonetizing.
The House version of the CDA which contained Section 230, and the earlier
Senate version, each became part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(“TCA”).155 A year later in Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court struck down the
provisions of the TCA that made up the CDA—all except Section 230.156 Thus
Exon’s battle against pornography generally disappeared from the TCA, and
Section 230 now stands alone, with no context to clarify its meaning.
Section 230 was, and is, an incredibly important piece of legislation. In some
ways it continues to serve its purpose admirably even after twenty-five years.
However, our digital universe has changed. Social media like YouTube (not yet
imagined in 1996) is a vital source of visibility, connectivity, and income for
marginalized groups of creators such as those in the LGBTQ+ community.
Allowing Section 230 to fully protect platforms from liability for inappropriate
removal or flagging of income-bearing (and not otherwise violent, lewd, et cetera)
content made by those creators, who rely on the platform for both exposure and
income, is objectively a misapplication of the statute. The solution lies in a simple
amendment.
PART III: REIMAGINING 230 AND RECOURSE FOR CREATORS
The ideal solution for the Divino Group issue of unwanted censorship by digital
platforms (and platforms’ algorithms) would be to enact a new piece of civil rights
legislation designating the LGBTQ+ community as a fully protected class, making
it a federal offense to discriminate against LGBTQ+ individuals and their content
on any platform whether monetized or not. Such a change would enable Section
230 to be more appropriately amended to state that no platform or host of content
may flag, remove, moderate, or demonetize content based solely upon keywords
that indicate LGBTQ+ affiliation. However, such sweeping changes to civil rights
legislation are unlikely in the foreseeable future. 157
In the meantime, this paper proposes the following changes to Section 230 to
help meet the needs of modern platforms as well as content creators.
First, amend Section 230(c)(2) to replace the words “otherwise objectionable”
with “objectively denigrating,” and add a clause indicating that the content creator
has the right to review and contest any moderation that the creator in good faith
believed to be in line with the published policies of the platform. This would be
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similar to the language of the notice and takedown procedures of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).158
Second, add a new clause, Section 230(c)(3), which would read: “A content
creator (“Creator”) whose content has been removed, moderated, demonetized,
flagged, or otherwise restricted from any platform or internet service provider
(“Platform”) more than six (6) times in a period of six (6) months has the right to
file a claim against that Platform for (1) reinstatement of their removed, moderated,
demonetized, flagged, or otherwise restricted content, and (2) damages totaling the
amount of calculated loss of advertising revenue and reasonably demonstrable loss
of social media following if, in good faith, the Creator can (a) demonstrate that their
content consistently fell within the policy parameters specified by that Platform and
(b) demonstrate financial loss or hardship directly imposed or proximately caused
by the demonetization of their content.”
These slight changes would modernize Section 230 and cause platforms to
seriously reevaluate their content-flagging mechanisms, procedures, and
algorithms to ensure that content such as that in the Divino Group lawsuit was not
inappropriately flagged and demonetized. The changes would provide some
recourse to LGBTQ+ content creators, who could legally argue for the
reinstatement of their monetized content within a brief, but reasonable, period postdemonetization in order to mitigate the financial losses caused by temporary
demonetization. Further, these changes would allow for a fine to be levied against
the platform for repeatedly mis-flagging the same creator’s content. While this
would not prohibit platforms from creating policies counter to the interests of the
LGBTQ+ community, it would encourage platforms like YouTube (who purport to
support the community)159 to reevaluate their blacklisting and flagging protocols
and algorithms. The changes would also incentivize platforms to fine-tune their
policy language while motivating creators to seek out the platforms that are acting
in their best interest both policy-wise and monetarily.
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CONCLUSION
Internet speech is now more important than could have possibly been imagined
when the World Wide Web was first unveiled in the mid-1990s. The internet itself
is now a gathering place, and in some cases the sole source of camaraderie, for
marginalized groups—especially the younger LGBTQ+ community. Digital
natives utilize social media to connect and learn from each other. Some, like the
content creators in the Divino Group lawsuit, earn an income solely or primarily
from allowing ad placements on the video content they create for their social media
channels. YouTube, as the far-and-away leader in providing hosted video content
for these communities and users, should not be one hundred percent immune from
liability for wrongly disallowing viewership of, or removing advertising revenue
from, those users’ videos simply because they contain LGBTQ+ keywords.
YouTube should enjoy Section 230 protections, as should any internet service
provider or platform. Section 230 should not be repealed. However, our legislators
need to bring Section 230 into modern times in order to allow creators adequate
recourse for unintentional flagging or censorship of content that causes those
creators to lose social media presence and revenue. This paper’s proposed changes
to Section 230 would do just that: enable creators to have content reinstated and
provide damages for loss of advertising income and loss of follower count. The
changes would not require that a platform allow all speech; rather, for those
platforms that purport to allow a certain manner of speech, the changes would
provide incentive for them to more intelligently author and manage their censorship
keywords, algorithms, and blacklist datasets. These changes would go a long way
towards providing a more reliable and non-discriminatory source of viewership,
income, and community for marginalized creators, such as LGBTQ+ creators.

